Between Generalism and Particularism: How Much is Life Worth?

Abstract

Moral damage compensation is characterized by the absence of clear objective criteria for its quantification. In court rulings, there is no fixed formula for determining the value of moral damages, and legislative attempts to impose “tariffing” are generally rejected, which can lead to subjective decisions. This results in a wide range of compensatory amounts, often varying based on the "status" of the offended party. Additionally, there are disagreements regarding the beneficiaries of such compensation, i.e., who is entitled to receive it. In cases involving moral damages resulting from death, there is a lack of jurisprudential uniformity concerning the quantification of the compensation, which can lead to unjust or discriminatory discrepancies. The distortions are particularly evident in cases involving the death of inmates, where the determination of compensation often reflects biases and subjectivity, leading to disproportionate awards. These distortions, especially in lower courts, are marked by particularist decisions and are difficult to rectify in higher courts, particularly in the Superior Court of Justice, where the review of compensation amounts faces procedural limitations. This study will conduct a sample analysis of rulings from the Superior Court of Justice to investigate these issues.